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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
RICHFIELD CITY, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Case No. 890156-CA 
-vs- ) 
: Priority No. 15 
JAMES M. WALKER, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to the Utah State Supreme Court 
from a Judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court in and for Sevier 
County, State of Utah, Honorable David L. Mower, following a 
non-jury trial on May 10, 1988. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and §78-2a-3(d), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the Court properly convicted 
Walker of being in actual physical control of a vehicle when 
his blood alcohol content was .08% or greater where Walker was 
found asleep on the seat of his pickup truck with the lights on 
and the keys in the ignition at a time when his blood alcohol 
content registered .21 on the intoxilyzer equipment. 
2. Was Walker properly convicted under a Richfield 
City Ordinance which was consistent with §41-6-44, U.C.A., 
1953. 
3. Could the Court have convicted Walker pursuant to 
§10-17-1 of the Richfield City Ordinances which adopts by 
reference the Utah Traffic Code, which would include §41-6-44, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended as of the date of the 
offense. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
Revised Ordinances of Richfield City, Ordinance No. 
1983-2 (attached hereto as Appendix pp. i.l through i.13: 
Section 1.1. It is unlawful and punishable 
as provided in this section for any person 
with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent 
or greater by weight, or who is under the 
influence of alcohol, or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug 
to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to 
drive or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this municipality. The fact 
that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to 
use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a 
defense against any charge of violating 
this section. 
Section 2. The provisions of sections 41-
6-44.3, 41-6-44.5 and 41-6-44.8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, hereby are adopted by 
reference. 
Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended: 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as 
provided in this section for any person to 
operate or be in actual physical control of 
a vehicle within this state if the person 
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has a blood or breath alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control, 
or if the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle. 
Section 41-6-44.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended: 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test 
results in actions for driving under the 
influence - Weight of evidence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of 
a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the 
results of a chemical test or tests as 
authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are 
admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more 
than two hours after the alleged driving or 
actual physical control, the test result is 
admissible as evidence of the person's 
blood or breath alcohol level at the time 
of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall 
determine what weight is given to the 
result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court 
from receiving otherwise admissible 
evidence as to a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol level or drug level at the 
time of the alleged operating or actual 
physical control. 
Section 10-17-1, Revised Ordinances of Richfield 
City: 
Utah Traffic Code Adopted. That certain 
code in book form known as "Utah Traffic 
Code, Rules of the Road, 1974" compiled by 
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the Department of Public Safety and as 
amended and superseded from time to time is 
hereby adopted as to all provisions 
contained in that code in book form which 
are not expressly covered by the foregoing 
chapters and all such laws, rules and 
regulations not covered by the foregoing 
chapters but contained in said code shall 
be in full force and effect within 
Richfield City. Not less than three (3) 
copies of said book shall remain on file in 
the Office of the City Recorder. (10-6-12; 
Title 41, UCA 1953, as it effects powers of 
local authorities to adopt traffic 
regulations, passim.) (Date of adoption 
1983) . 
Section 10-3-710, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended: 
Publication in book, pamphlet or looseleaf 
form - State statutes. 
Ordinances revised, codified, compiled 
and published in book, pamphlet or 
looseleaf form by authority of the 
governing body needed not be printed or 
published in any other manner, except that 
the ordinance adopting the revision, 
codification or compilation shall be 
published or posted in the manner provided 
by law. Provisions of state law may be 
adopted by reference. Any changes 
necessary to conform those state laws with 
municipal ordinance shall be noted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant James M. Walker (hereinafter 
"Walker") appeals from a judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Sevier County, State of Utah, wherein he was found guilty of 
being in actual physical control of a vehicle with a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or greater in violation of §1983-2 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Richfield City and §41-6-44, Utah 
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Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At 1:30 a.m. on the 30th day of June, 1987, 
Walker was found by a Richfield City Police Officer asleep on 
the seat of his pickup truck with the headlights on and the 
keys still in the ignition. (R. 3) 
2. The facts proffered by Walker and stipulated to 
by the parties were that Walker had attempted to obtain a motel 
room and upon finding no vacancy returned to his truck to 
sleep. (R. 5,6) No testimony was proffered to indicate that 
there were ever any other occupants of the Walker truck or that 
anyone else had driven the truck or intended to drive the truck 
from the scene. 
3. Upon being awakened from his sleep, Walker became 
belligerent with the officers. (R. 4) Field sobriety tests 
were performed by Walker as directed by the officers as a 
result of which Walker was arrested and taken to the Sheriff's 
office where an intoxilyzer test, which was admitted in 
evidence showing a resulting score of .21. (R. 4,5) 
4. The intoxilyzer test was administered within one-
half hour from the first observation of Walker. (R. 5) 
5. Following a trial to the Court on May 10, 1988, 
and subsequent briefing by the parties, the Court found Walker 
guilty of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
his blood alcohol content was .08% or greater by weight 
pursuant to Ordinance 1983-2 of the Richfield City Revised 
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Ordinances; the Court having found this Ordinance to be in 
effect and enforceable despite the fact that it did not 
incorporate amendments to the State statute on driving under 
the influence following the enactment of the Ordinance. 
6. In its Memorandum Decision (Appendix ii) , the 
Court further held that Richfield City's Ordinance adopting the 
Utah Traffic Code by reference, (§10-17-1) was ineffective or 
invalid as to any amendments to the Utah Traffic Code. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence before the Court was sufficient to 
convict Walker of being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. Walker has never contended that he was a mere 
passenger or that anyone else had operated the truck or would 
have operated the truck from the point at which he was found by 
the police officers. Walker's repose which could easily have 
been interrupted at any time was the only thing standing 
between him and the operation of the vehicle. The threat that 
this situation presented to his safety and that of the public 
is precisely the danger that the Legislature intended to curb 
by enacting laws covering the control as well as operation of a 
vehicle. 
The Court properly found that Richfield City 
Ordinance No. 1983-2 was enforceable and in all respects valid. 
Section 41-6-43, Utah Code Annotated requires that any local 
ordinances governing driving under the influence must be 
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consistent with State provisions. To be consistent, the 
ordinance does not have to be identical. The substance of the 
City Ordinance is consistent with the State Code both in 
language and in application. 
The Court could have convicted Walker under Richfield 
City Ordinance §10-17-1 which incorporates by reference all 
provisions of the Utah Traffic Code as amended. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld federal statutes which incorporate by 
reference state laws as expressly holding that such was not an 
unlawful delegation of legislative power. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY CONVICTED WALKER OF 
BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A 
VEHICLE WHEN HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT WAS 
.08% OR GREATER WHERE WALKER WAS FOUND 
ASLEEP ON THE SEAT OF HIS PICKUP TRUCK WITH 
THE LIGHTS ON AND THE KEYS IN THE IGNITION 
AT A TIME WHEN HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT 
WAS .21. 
An intoxicated person having immediate access to and 
control of a motor vehicle even though not actually driving 
poses a serious threat to the safety of the public and himself. 
Legislation prohibiting "actual physical control" of a motor 
vehicle by an intoxicated person is based on the principle that 
it is better to punish such a person for mere control of the 
vehicle than it is to punish him after he has injured himself 
or someone else. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Lopez vs. Schwendiman, 72 0 
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P. 2d 778 (Utah 1986) focuses on the control or authority 
exerted by the defendant over the vehicle in arriving at the 
place it was found and refers to reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn about how the vehicle arrived at that point. The 
court stated: 
The focus should not be narrowly upon the 
mechanical condition of the car when it 
comes to rest, but upon the status of its 
occupants and the nature of the authority 
he or she exerted over the vehicle in 
arriving at the place from which, by virtue 
of its inoperability, it can no longer 
move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference 
that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the 
defendant's choice, it follows that the 
defendant was in actual, physical control. 
The facts of this case are such that it is reasonable 
to infer that Walker's vehicle was driven to the scene of the 
arrest by Walker and that Walker would have operated the 
vehicle had the police not intervened. Walker has never 
asserted that anyone else had ever been a passenger on the 
evening of the arrest. Nor has he ever asserted that anyone 
else would have been available to operate the vehicle had the 
police not intervened. 
It should be noted that the vehicle in Lopez was not 
operable at the time the police arrived. This was also the 
fact in the Utah Supreme Court case of Garcia vs. Schwendiman, 
645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). The court in neither case expressed 
reluctance in finding the defendant guilty even though the 
vehicles could not be driven from the point of arrest. 
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If the intent of the statute is to prevent the 
defendant from injuring himself or a third person by operating 
the vehicle in his control, it is more logical to convict 
Walker than to convict the defendants in Lopez and Garcia 
because Walker had a usable vehicle and the only thing that 
stood in the way of his operation of the vehicle was the fact 
that he was temporarily asleep. 
POINT II 
WALKER WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER A 
RICHFIELD CITY ORDINANCE WHICH IS 
CONSISTENT WITH §41-6-44 U.C.A. 
Even though Richfield Ordinance No. 1983-2 may not be 
identical to §41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, it is consistent 
with the State statute and applied consistently with the State 
statute. 
In comparing Ordinance No. 1983-2 with §41-6-44 the 
only substantive difference is the failure of the Ordinance to 
recite that the chemical test be given within two hours of 
first observation. 
Even before §41-6-44 was amended to specifically 
provide for the time frame for the administration of chemical 
tests, this principle or procedure was already covered by §41-
6-44.5, Utah Code Annotated which reads: 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test 
results in actions for driving under the 
influence - Weight of evidence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of 
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a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the 
results of a chemical test or tests as 
authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are 
admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more 
than two hours after the alleged driving or 
actual physical control, the test result is 
admissible as evidence of the person's 
blood or breath alcohol level at the time 
of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall 
determine what weight is given to the 
result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court 
from receiving otherwise admissible 
evidence as to a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol level or drug level at the 
time of the alleged operating or actual 
physical control. 
The Richfield City Ordinance No. 1983-2 in Sub-
section 2 adopts by reference §41-6-44.5. Section 41-6-44.5, 
with the exception of a few technical changes, appears in 
substance the same as it did back in 1983 when it was adopted 
by reference in Richfield City Ordinance No. 1983-2. 
The record reflects that the court specifically 
inquired into the lapse of time between the first observation 
of Walker and the administration of the test. (R.5) The 
questioning revealed that the test was administered within one-
half hour from the time of first observation. The ordinance 
has been applied in this case consistent with the provisions on 
testing within a given time frame. 
Walker seems to contend that the City has failed 
properly to define the criminal offense of D.U.I, consistent 
with the State statute by its failure to include the language 
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concerning the time of administration of any test. The absence 
of this language from the City Ordinance does not make the 
Ordinance inconsistent with the State Code. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COULD HAVE CONVICTED WALKER UNDER 
§10-17-1 OF THE RICHFIELD CITY ORDINANCES 
WHICH ADOPTS BY REFERENCE THE UTAH TRAFFIC 
CODE, AS AMENDED WHICH WOULD HAVE 
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE ALL AMENDMENTS 
MADE TO §41-6-44. 
Section 10-3-710, Utah Code Annotated expressly 
authorizes cities to adopt State law by reference. It provides 
in pertinent part: 
•••provisions of state law may be adopted 
by reference. Any changes necessary to 
conform those state laws with municipal 
ordinances shall be noted. 
Section 10-17-1 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Richfield City adopts by reference the Utah Traffic Code and 
provides: 
That certain code in book form known as 
"Utah Traffic Code, Rules of the Road, 
1974" compiled by the Department of Public 
Safety and as amended and superceded from 
time to time is hereby adopted as to all 
provisions contained in that code in book 
form which are not expressly covered by the 
foregoing chapters and all such laws, rules 
and regulations not covered by the 
foregoing chapters but contained in said 
code shall be in full force and effect 
within Richfield City. *** 
Walker argues that such an adoption by reference of a 
State Code is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative 
power and cites a Nebraska case as its sole authority for its 
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position. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in at least two cases has 
declined to accept the argument that the adoption by reference 
of state law by the United States Congress is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 
In United States vs. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 2 L 
Ed. 2d 282, 78 S.Ct. 291, the court held that the congress may 
adopt by reference current and future state criminal 
legislation and apply it to persons within federal territories 
located in the given state. It noted that congress retained 
the power to exclude a particular state law from the effect of 
such adoption by reference. 
Likewise in Franklin vs. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 
54 L Ed. 615, 3 0 S.Ct. 434, the court rejected the argument for 
the finding of an unlawful delegation of legislative power by 
the Congress and upheld an act which adopted by reference the 
state criminal legislation made applicable to persons in 
locations under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
United States. 
By contending that the City has unconstitutionally 
delegated its legislative authority, Walker ignores the fact 
that the City retains at all times the power to repeal or amend 
any ordinance adopting state law by reference and likewise 
retains the power to exclude particular provisions of state lav 
so adopted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence against the Defendant was sufficient to 
convict him of being in actual physical control of a vehicle 
when his blood alcohol content was .08% or greater. The Court 
properly convicted the Defendant under the Richfield City 
Ordinance 1983-2 which is, in all respects, consistent with 
§41-6-44, U.C.A. The Court, likewise, could have convicted the 
Defendant pursuant to the Richfield City Ordinance §10-17-1 
which properly adopted by reference the Utah Traffic Code 
including §41-6-44, U.C.A., as amended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIFF/V>HAM^E^LAIN 
BY. 
Rich^jd ^ K. Chamberlain 
Richfield City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed to Shelden R. Carter, 
Attorney for Appellant, 3325 North University Avenue, Suite 
2 00, Jamestown Square, Clocktower Building, Provo, Utah 
(84601), by U.S. regular mail, postage prepaid, on this 15th 
day of September, 1989. 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT 
Address: 250 North Main, Richfield, UT 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896- 8075 
Richfield City, 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. 
Case no. 87-TF-1140 
James M. Walker, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on 
May 10, 1933, the Plaintiff being represented by Richard K. 
Chamberlain and the Defendant appearing and represented by Mr. 
Shelden carter. The matter was not tried, however, but presented to 
the Court on stipulation of facts in this action. Mr. Carter 
submitted a Memorandum to the Court and Mr. Chamberlain was given 
leave to reply to that Memorandum, and the Court took this matter 
under advisement. 
Defendant was charged by plaintiff with the offense of Driving 
while Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUI) by traffic citation 
number D02691 issued on June 30, 1987 by Officer Duane Sickels, 
Richfield City Police. The citation charged a violation of Section 
41-6-44, Utah Code, occurring in Richfield City. 
Richfield City v. Walker, 87-TF-1140 
Memorandum Decision - Page 2 
Shelden Carter appeared for the defendant on July 10, 1987, 
plead not guilty and requested a jury trial. 
A jury trial was scheduled for October 26, 1987, but was not 
held after counsel advised the Court that the matter had been 
resolved. 
Pursuant thereto, the Court expected defendant to appear and 
to enter a plea. Appearance dates were scheduled on January 12, 
February 9, and March 8, 1988. The prosecutor appeared at the March 
8th hearing to advise the Court that the defendant was not willing 
to proceei with the stipulation. Consequently, the matter was 
scheduled for non-jury trial on May 10, 1988. 
Plaintiff filed a formal information on or about May 3, 1988, 
charging defendant with violating Richfield City Ordinance number 
1983-2 and Section 4£-6-44, Utah Code Annotated. (It is assumed that 
the reference to Title 44 is a typographical error and that the 
reference should be 41^-6-44). 
On May 10, 1988, the matter was submitted to the Court for 
decision based on stipulated facts. Mr. Carter submitted a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. The Court took the 
matter under advisement. 
Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss on May 20, 1988. Both of these memoranda addressed the issue 
of "actual physical control." 
On May 31, 1988, defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal and 
Memorandum, claiming, for the first time, that the Court had no 
Richfield City v. Walker, 87-TF-1140 
Memorandum Decision - Page 3 
jurisdiction to proceed under the city ordinance since it is 
inconsistent with the present codification of 41-6-44, Otah Code 
and therefore repealed by implication. 
Plaintiff replied on July 16, 1988 in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion for Dismissal. 
The Court issued its decision on June 29, 1988 finding the 
defendant guilty and ordering him to appear for imposition of 
judgment on July 19, 1988 at Richfield, Utah. In that decision, the 
Court concluded that the plaintiff's 1976 adoption of the Utah 
Traffic Code was effective to adopt any and all post-1976 
legislative amendments thereto, and thus denied defendant's motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum on August 3, 1988 in 
which he, in essence, asked the Court to reconsider it's June 29th 
decision. 
Defendant moved to continue the sentencing hearing from July 
19, 1983 to August 9, 1988, which was granted. On August 9, 1988, 
Mr. Carter's office called the Court asking for a further 
continuance, which was granted until August 30, 1988. For a reason 
not disclosed by the file, the sentencing hearing was held on 
September 6, 1988. Mr. 3lackwell, a local attorney, appeared at the 
request of Mr. Carter, but the defendant did not appear. A bench 
warrant was authorized, and subsequently issued on September 22, 
1988. 
The sentencing hearing was held on October 11, 1988. Both 
Richfield City v. Walker, 87-TF-1140 
Memorandum Decision - Page 4 
defendant and Mr. Carter were present. The bench warrant was ordered 
recalled. 
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant renewed his motion to 
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. The Court imposed judgment, 
but stayed the execution thereof and took defendant's motion under 
advisement. 
A N A L Y S I S 
Plaintiff is an incorporated city, existing by virtue of the 
laws of this State. Sections 10-1-101, et seg. , Utah Code. It is 
empowered to enact ordinances, the enforcement: of which is handled 
by the city prosecutor. Sections 10-3-701 and 10-7-65, Utah Code. 
As a general rule, city prosecutors are not empowered to 
enforce state law, a function handled by the various county 
attorneys. Section 17-18-1, Utah Code. 
The state and the various cities and towns have concurrent 
power to regulate traffic and travel on public streets and 
highways. Article VI, Section 1, Utah Constitution, and Section 
10-8-30, Utah Code. 
In 1983 the State preempted the field in DOI law by 
prohibiting cities from enacting any ordinance at variance with 
State law. Section 41-6-43, Utah Code. While some may argue that 
such a preemption should have been accompanied by a grant of 
authority to cities to prosecute DUI violations under State law, 
such was not the case. As near as the Court can determine, Section 
41-2-136 is the only State law which city prosecutors may 
Richfield City v. Walker, 87-TF-1140 
Memorandum Decision - Page 5 
prosecute. Section 41-6-44.8, Utah Code. 
in apparent response to the Legislature's action, Richfield 
City adopted its ordinance #1983-2. This ordinance qualified for 
adoption under 41-6-43 at the time because it was consistent with 
State law. However, the City has not amended the ordinance to track 
amendments made by the Legislature to its DUI laws since 1983, nor 
was the City required to do so. The Legislature's prohibition on 
nonconformity can only be prospective rather than retroactive in 
nature, i.e., it can only apply to new enactments and cannot act to 
invalidate existing law. To hold otherwise could conceivably leave 
Richfield City with no DUI Law. 
The City argues that in 1976 it adopted by reference the 
entire Utah Traffic Code which includes State DUI law, and that that 
adoption was sufficient to adopt any and all post-1976 amendments 
thereto, including the 1983 DUI law, thus reducing the adoption of 
City ordinance #1983-2 to a nullity. The Court rejects this argument 
since it is tantamount to saying that the City has delegated to the 
legislature its lawmaking authority in regard to traffic matters. 
Such is an unauthorized delegation. State v. Lookabill, 176 
Neb.254, 125 NW2d 695, 697 (1964). 
The Court hereby reverses its decision of June 29, 1988 but 
only to the extent that it held the city's 1976 adoption of the Utah 
Traffic Code effective to adopt post-1976 amendments. 
At this point, then, the Court has concluded and does conclude 
that ordinance #1983-2 is valid and enforceable, and that the 
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prosecution of this case has proceeded and may further proceed 
thereunder. This conclusion leaves one final issue for analysis, 
i.e., punishment, and specifically, whether the punishment imposed 
by the Court on October 11, 1988 is consistent with ordinance 
#1983-2. 
The penalty provisions of the ordinance are found in Sections 
1.3 and 1.4 thereof, in relation to the facts in this case, the 
maximum penalty would be a fine of $299, a 60-day jail term with a 
48-hour mandatory minimum, and completion of an assessment and 
educacion series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, 
A comparison of the Court's sentencing order made on October 
11, 1988 with the above penalty provisions reveals variances in the 
jail sentence and in the fines and fees portions. Consequently, the 
Court has made an Amended Judgment of Conviction, Sentence and 
Committment, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Dated this ~7 day of J^m^rrr, 1989. 
Da\Tf2TL. Mower, Circuit Judge 
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of the within and foregoing Memorandum U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid, 
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 day of February, 1989 to the following: 
Richard K. Chamberlain, Attorney for Richfield City, 
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ORDINANCE NO. 1983-2 
AN ORDINANCE RELATING TO DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 
OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS, ESTABLISHING 
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING INTOXICATION OR IMPAIRMENT; 
ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES TO TAKE LICENSES AND SETTING 
MINIMUM BLOOD-ALCOHOL CONTENT. 
Be it ordained by the City Council of Richfield, Utah: 
Section 1. 1.1 It is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of 
.08 percent or greater by weight, or who is under the influence 
of alcohol, or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this municipality. The fact that 
a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute 
a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
1.2 Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters 
of blood. 
1.3 Every person who is convicted the first time of a 
violation of subsection (1) of this section shall be punished 
by imprisonment for not less than 60 days nor more than six 
months, or by a fine of $299, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment; except that if the person has inflicted a bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated 
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the vehicle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, 
and, in the discretion of the court, by fine of not more than 
$1,000• For the purpose of this section, the standard of 
negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
that degree of care which ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
1.4 In addition to the penalties provided for in subsection 
1.3, the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 4 8 consecutive hours nor more than 
10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank cf the 
jail, or require the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than two nor more than 10 days and, in 
addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
1.5 Upon a second conviction within five years after a 
first conviction under this section, the Court shall, in 
addition to the penalties provided for in subsection 1.3, impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 4 8 consecutive hours 
nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 10 nor more than 30 days 
and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the 
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community-service work program, order the person to participate 
in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility and the court may, in its discretion, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility• Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after 
a second conviction under this section, the court shall, in 
addition to the penalties provided for in subsection 1.3, impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 90 
days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or 
require the person to work in a community-service work project 
for not less than 30 nor more than 30 days and, in addition to 
the jail sentence or work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. No portion of any sentence imposed under subsection 
1.3 shall be suspended and the convicted person shall not be 
eligible for parole or probation until such time as any sentence 
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole 
resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section 
shall not be terminated and the Department of Public Safety 
shall not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a 
result of such conviction, if it is a second or subsequent such 
conviction within five years, until and unless the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department 
that all fines and fees, including fees for restitution, and 
rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid. 
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1.6 The provisions in subsections 1.4 and 1.5 that require 
a sentencing court to order a convicted person to participate 
in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility, obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or 
obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility, or do any combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of section 5 that qualifies as a 
prior offense under subsection 1.7, so as to require the court 
to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an 
alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under section 5 that 
qualifies as a prior offense under subsection 1.7, as he would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of subsections 
1.4 and 1.5. For purposes of determining whether a conviction 
under section 5 which qualified as a prior conviction under 
subsection 1.7, is a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under this subsection, a previous conviction under either 
section 1 or 5 is deemed a prior conviction. Any alcohol 
rehabilitation program and any community-based or other 
eudcation program provided for in this section must be approved 
by the Department of Social Services. 
1.7.1 When the prosecution agrees to plea of guilty or 
no contest to a charge of a violation of section 5 in satisfaction 
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of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation 
of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record a 
factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, 
by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement 
shall be an offer or proof of the facts which show whether or 
not there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant, in connection with the offense. 
1.7.2 The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences 
of a violation of section 5 as follows: If the court aooepts 
the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating section 5, and the prosecutor states for the record 
that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the 
resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for the purposes 
of subsection 1.5 of this. 
1.7.3 The court shall notify the Department of Public 
Safety of each conviction of section 5 which shall be a prior 
offense for the purposes of subsection 1.5. 
1.8 A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a 
person for a violation of this section when the violation is 
coupled with an accident or collision in which the person 
involved and when the violation has, in fact, been committed, 
although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable 
cause to belive that the violation was committed by the person. 
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1.9 The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for a 
period of 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted 
for the first time under subsection 1.1 of this section, and 
shall revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise 
convicted under this section, except that the department 
may subtract from any suspension period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, if the previous suspension was based 
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based 
upon. (See 41-6-44, UCA). 
Section 2. The previsions of ser.icr.s 41-6-44.3, 41-6-44.5 
and 41-6-44.8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, hereby are adopted by 
reference. 
Section 3. 3.1 Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this municipality shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug as 
detailed in section 1 so long as the test is or tests are 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds 
to believe that person to have been driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed 
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in section 1. A peace officer shall determine which of the 
aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
No person who has been requested under this section to 
submit a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine, shall have the right to select the test or tests to be 
administrated. The failure or inability of a peace officer 
to arrange for any specific test is not a defense with regard 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer and shall not 
be a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested 
test: cr zeszs. 
3.2 If the person has been placed under arrest and has 
thereafter been requested by a peace officer to submit to any 
one or more of the chemical tests provided for in subsection 
3.1 of this section and refuses to submit to the chemical test 
or tests, the person requesting the test or tests shall warn 
him that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result 
in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. 
Following the warning, unless the person immediately requests 
the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer 
shall submit a sworn report to the Department of Public Safety, 
within five days after the date of the arrest, that he had 
grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or while under the 
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influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and 
any drug as detailed in section 1 and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in 
subsection 3.1. 
3.3 Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any 
such chemical test or tests shall be deemed not to have with-
drawn the consent provided for in subsection 3.1 of this section, 
and the test or tests may be administered whether such person 
has been arrested or not, 
5.4 Upon the request of the cerson who was tested, the 
results of such test or tests shall be made available to him. 
3.5 Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse 
or person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, acting at the request of a peace officer can 
withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic 
or drug content therein. This limitation shall not apply to 
the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any physician, 
registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under 
subsection 26-1-30 (19), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, who, at 
the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood 
from any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe 
is driving in violation of this chapter, or the hospital or 
medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be 
immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, 
provided such test is administered according to standard medical 
practice. 
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3.6 The person to be tested may, at his own expense, 
have a physician of his own choosing administer a chemical test 
in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of the peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such 
additional test shall not affect admissibility of the results 
of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, 
nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be 
subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of a peace officer. 
3.7 For the purpose c: determining whether to subr.it to 
a chemical test or tests, the person to be tested shall not 
have the right to consult an attorney nor shall such a person 
be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
3.8 If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical test or tests under the provisions of this section, 
evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed while the person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug. (See 
41.6.44.10, UCA). 
Section 4. It is unlawful for any person who is under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor or any narcotic drugs to 
drive or be in actual physical control of any recreation vechicle 
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within this municipality. Violators will be subject to all 
procedures, implied consent, presumptions and punishments, 
provisions of section 3 except subsection 3.3. It is also 
unlawful and punishable under subsection 1.3 for any person, 
after being placed under arrest for violation of this section, 
to refuse to submit to any one of the chemical tests provided. 
(See 41-22-14, UCA). 
Section 5. 5.1 Any person who drives any vehicle in 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property 
is guilty of reckless driving. 
5.2 Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be 
punished upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a period 
of not less than five days nor more than six months or by a 
fine of not less than $25 nor more than $299, or by both such 
fines and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent conviction, 
the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less 
than $50 nor more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(See 41-6-45, UCA). 
Section 6. 6.1 In each case where a defendant is convicted 
of violating section 1 or a criminal prohibition that he was 
charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain after 
having been originally charged with violating section 1, 
the court, including justice of the peace courts, shall, at the 
time of sentencing, assess up to $150 for a first conviction 
and up to $299 for each subsequent conviction, above any fine 
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imposed, and to be collected by the court or an entity appointed 
by the court, for the purpose of funding programs described in 
section 63-43-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
6.2 In addition to the fees provided in subsection 1, the 
court shall impose against such a defendant further assessments, 
above any fine imposed, and to be collected by the court or an 
entity appointed by the court, to fully compensate agencies 
which treat the defendant for their costs. (See 63-43-1, UCA). 
Section 7. A person originally charged with violating 
sections 1, 4, or 5 who shall, as the result of a plea bargain, 
have the charge reduced, shall be punished by a fine of at 
least $299 but not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not 
more than one year or by both such fine and imprisonment. (See 
41-2-30, UCA). 
Section 8. 8.1 Automobile homicide constitutes criminal 
homicide if the actor, while under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any drug, to a degree which renders 
the actor incapable of safely driving a vehicle, causes the 
death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a negligent 
manner. For the purposes of this section, the standard of 
negligence shall be that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care which ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
8.2 Any chemical test administered on a defendant with his 
consent or after his arrest under this section, v/hether with or 
against his consent, shall be admissible in accordance with the 
rules of evidence. 
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8.3 For purposes of this section, a motor vehicle consti-
tutes any self-propelled vehicle and includes, but is not 
limited to, any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, 
engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
8.4 Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree. 
Section 9. All ordinances inconsistent with the provisions 
of this ordinance hereby are repealed. Any offense committed 
prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by 
the ordinances of this municipality existing at the time of 
commission thereof. 
Section 10. The previsions of this ordinance are severable. 
Section 11. This ordinance shall take effect immediately 
on publication. 
Passed this 28th day of July, 1983 by the City Council 
of Richfield, Utah. 
r •, ? .
 (/ 
VSU£ Mar i e /Xoung 
M a y o ^ 
ATTEST: 
.iAA^s^ VV/L. 
arial Sorensen 
City Recorder 
ORDINANCE NO. 1983-3 
AN ORDINANCE RELATING TO DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED OR UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF DRUGS, ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING INTOXICATION 
OR IMPAIRMENT; ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES TO TAKE LICENSES AND SETTING 
MINIMUM BLOOD-ALCOHOL CONTENT. 
Be it ordained by the City Council of Richfield City, Sevier County, Utah; 
Section 1. Section 7 of the above referenced ordinance is amended to 
read: 
Section 7. A person whose conviction under 41-2-28, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, is based on his driving while his operator's or chauffeur's license is 
suspended or revoked for a violation of Sections 1, 3, or 8 or a criminal 
prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea 
tircair. i^ie^ having been oricir^lly charged with violating one or more of 
Sections 1 , 3, or 8 shall be punishec oy a fine of at least llhl- but net more 
than $1000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. 
Section 2. This ordinance shall take effect immediately on publication. 
Dated this 22nd day of September, 1933. 
;
 Sue (Marie Jtoung •/ 
Mayor 
ATTEST: 
r 
Mterial Sorensen 
City Recorder 
APPENDIX P. ii.13 
Published in The Richfield Reaper September 28, 1983. 
